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Abstract
The UK has experienced a dramatic increase in earnings and income inequality over the
past four decades. We use detailed micro level information to construct quarterly historical
measures of inequality from 1969 to 2012. We investigate whether monetary policy shocks
played a role in explaining this increase in inequality. We nd that contractionary monetary
policy shocks lead to an increase in earnings, income and consumption inequality and contribute
to their uctuation. The response of income and consumption at di¤erent quantiles suggests
that contractionary policy has a larger negative e¤ect on low income households and those
that consume the least when compared to those at the top of the distribution. Our evidence
also suggests that the policy of quantitative easing may have contributed to the increase in
inequality over the Great Recession.
Keywords : Inequality, Earnings, Income, SVAR, Monetary Policy Shocks
JEL No. E2, E3, E4, E5
1 Introduction
The latest nancial and sovereign crises left Western economies with rising levels of inequality.
A number of studies (e.g. Beleld, Cribb, Hood and Joyce, 2014; Blundell and Etheridge, 2010;
Brewer and Wren-Lewis, 2012) present evidence of rising income inequality for the UK up to 2007-
8. According to Beleld et al. (2014) the Gini coe¢ cient for UK householdsdisposable income
has increased over the last 45 years from 0.25 in 1967 to 0.36 in 2007-8. Similar trends appear
for net labour earnings where the Gini increased from 0.32 in 1968 to 0.35 in 2008 (Brewer and
Wren-Lewis, 2012).
A growing area of research is trying to explain the rising trend and to identify the contributing
factors. Skill based education and technological advances, changes in the family structure, employ-
ment status and occupation, structural reforms in the labour market, globalisation and increased
international trade have all contributed to wage and income inequality (see for example Card, 2001;
Bound and Johnson, 1992; Feenstra and Hanson, 2008). However, the above factors are only part
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of the story: trying to decompose changes in income inequality, Brewer and Wren-Lewis. (2012)
nd that a large amount of the UK income inequality for the period 1968-2007 remains unexplained
and this amount has increased to over 50% over the total variation towards the end of the period.
While scal policy has received substantial attention as a contributing factor to inequality, the
role of monetary policy is still to be decided. Earlier studies present a contradictory view on the
matter: Galbraith (1998), for example, argues that strict ination targeting policies caused a series of
recessions, higher unemployment rates and therefore a rise in inequality. Coibion et al. (2012) note
that the expansionary monetary policy of Federal Reserve boosted share prices beneting mainly
shareholders, participants of nancial markets and trade, who are usually the wealthier households.
In addition, low income households hold most of their wealth in liquid assets which are the most
vulnerable to ination inducing monetary policies. In a recent contribution, Auclert (2016) points
out that the impact of monetary policy through this channel depends on the maturity duration of
assets and liabilities. In particular, expansionary monetary policy tends to provide a larger benet
to households who have negative unhedged interest rate exposure i.e. households whose maturing
liabilities exceed their maturing assets. Opposite e¤ects have been also documented: Expansionary
monetary policies and low interest rates favour borrowers who may be low income households while
savers and lenders are adversely a¤ected (Doepke and Schneider, 2006).
Hence monetary policy can have an ambiguous e¤ect on inequality. The relationship complicates
further by taking into account the sources of income of households. If policy a¤ects wages and labour
income, then households for which wage is the most important source of income will be a¤ected
by more. If monetary policy substantially alters asset prices, high income households which hold
nancial wealth will be highly a¤ected.
Coibion et al. (2012) investigate whether the US monetary policy has contributed to changes
in consumption and income inequality. The authors use household level data from the Consumer
Expenditures Survey (CEX) since 1980 at quarterly frequency to construct their di¤erent measures
of inequality and to see how these measures respond to monetary policy shocks as identied by
Romer and Romer (2004). Their ndings suggest that contractionary monetary policy shocks
signicantly increase income, consumption and wage inequality among US households.
In the present study we investigate whether monetary policy shocks have a¤ected earnings,
income and consumption inequality in the UK.1 While our work is closely related to Coibion et al.
(2012), there are a number of important distinguishing features. First, our paper uses a substantially
longer quarterly time series for the inequality measures - from 1969 to 2012. This period includes a
number of recessions and expansions where the Bank of England used a variety of policies, with this
variation providing a stronger identication of policy shocks. Second, in addition to investigating
the impact of standard monetary policy, we also examine the impact of unconventional monetary
policy on inequality.2
1 In a previous version of this paper we use annual data on the Gini coe¢ cient in a mixed frequency VAR to
investigate this issue. See Mumtaz and Theophilopoulou (2015).
2Over the past year, additional studies have applied similar methods to investigate this issue for di¤erent sets
of countries. This includes Guerello (2016) for the Euro Area and Furceri et.al (2016) for developed and emerging
countries who nd that monetary contraction raises inequality and Inui et.al (2017) for Japan who report an unstable
relationship between inequality measures and policy changes.
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Using a Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) we nd that contractionary monetary policy
shocks lead to an increase in earnings, income and consumption inequality. These results remain
invariant to alternative specications of the VAR. We nd that the monetary policy shock makes
important contributions to historical uctuations in the inequality measures. In order to investi-
gate the possible factors behind the increase in inequality we estimate the SVAR using data for
households at di¤erent percentiles of the distribution. Results from this exercise suggest that the
contractionary monetary policy shock decreases wages and income for households at the low end of
the distribution while households at the upper end are less a¤ected. This is consistent with richer
households deriving a larger proportion of their income from investments. Finally, our results also
suggest that the policy of quantitative easing led to an increase in the inequality measures.
These results have important policy implications at a time when the Bank of England is con-
templating the possibility of switching from unconventional to conventional monetary policy. Our
results suggest that policy makers need to take redistributive e¤ects of policy changes into account.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the variables used, their
transformations and the construction of the inequality measures. Section 3 describes the estimation
of the structural VAR model and the identication scheme. Section 4 presents the main results for
earnings, income and consumption, while section 5 concludes.
2 Data
We construct inequality measures for four variables: disposable income, total consumption, con-
sumption of non durables and gross wage. The rst three variables are at household level while
the last one is at individual level. We draw micro data from the Family Expenditure Survey (FES)
from 1969 to 2012. The FES is an annual survey which provides detailed information on demo-
graphics, income, expenditure and consumption for on average of a representative sample of 7,000
UK households per year. The households who participate on FES are asked to keep a diary with
their spending of a two week period. In 2001 FES merged with the National Food Survey and be-
came the Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS) and with the Living Costs and Food Survey (LCFS)
in 20083 . Even though the FES has been running from 1957 there are discontinuities and small
samples prior to 1968 and for this reason we start our sample from 1969. Some studies (see for
example Foster, 1996, van de Ven, 2011) point out representation problems with the survey: FES
tends to over represent mortgage holders, people living in the countryside, older households and
under represents people living in council ats, institutions (e.g. retirement homes, military), no
xed address holders, ethnic minorities, self employed, manual workers and younger households.
The variable for disposable income is dened as weekly household income net of taxes and
national insurance contributions. It is summed across all members living in the same household
and it is referred throughout the text as Households Disposable Income. After keeping only the
positive values and trimming we have on average 6,900 households per year until 2006 and then the
average drops to 5,600 per year. Thus, in total we have around 290,000 observations of household
3 In 1993-94 the FES changes from a calender year to nancial year (April to March) and the EFS goes back to
the calender year in 2006.
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income for the whole sample period. The income variable is equivalised for the family size and
composition by using the modied OECD scale taking as benchmark of living standard the income
of a couple without dependent children.
The variable for gross wage is Gross Personal Earnings which is the normal gross wage from any
type of occupation before taxes including national insurance contributions and other deductions
and bonuses. Gross wage is at the individual level, converted to weekly amounts4 . Taking into
account only positive values we have on average 7,000 observations per year or around 300,000
observations over the 43 year period. Inequality measures constructed from data on wages have the
smaller measurement error as gross wage is known to households with higher precision than other
forms of income, however it has the disadvantage that it is only one source of income.
We use the National Accounts denition for the total consumption variable available in FES
which is the sum of housing, food, alcohol, tobacco, fuel, light and power, clothing and footwear,
durable household goods, other goods, transport, vehicles and services. The non durable consump-
tion variable excludes housing and durable household goods but includes the rest of the components
of the total consumption. The two consumption variables are divided by the number of people that
live in the household to construct consumption per capita.
The distributions of all four variables have been trimmed by removing the top and bottom 1%.
Even though the tails of the distributions have important and complex relations with monetary
policy they are likely to contain measurement errors as their inclusion causes erratic shifts in the
inequality measures. Thus we follow the existing literature on this issue (see for instance Brewer
and Wren-Lewis, 2012) and trim the tails by 1%.
The following macroeconomic variables are also used in the analysis below: (1) GDP per capita
and in real terms (code=ABMI, ONS divided by population). (2) Ination based on the Consumer
Price Index (CPI). The CPI series is based on the seasonally adjusted harmonized index of consumer
prices spliced with the retail price index excluding mortgage payments. These data are obtained
from the Bank of England database. The three month treasury bill rate and the nominal e¤ective
exchange rate are obtained from Global Financial Data.
2.1 Measures of Inequality
We use two widely used measures of Inequality: the Gini coe¢ cient of levels which is one of the most
commonly used measures of inequality and takes values between 0 (perfect equality) and 1 (perfect
inequality). The second measure is the cross sectional standard deviation of log levels which removes
zero values thus reducing sensitivity to extreme values. Following Cloyne and Surico (2017), we
assign households to di¤erent quarters within a year based on the date of survey interview. This
allows us to calculate the measures of inequality at a quarterly frequency.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the Gini coe¢ cients for disposable income, total consumption,
consumption of non durables and gross personal wage. During the 1970s and until the end of the
decade a decrease in the inequality measures is observed mostly through wages as high earners
experienced fall of their wages relative to low earners. Relative earnings of women increased and
4 If the individual works full time, the weekly payment is dened as earnings, while in the case of a part time or
odd job, the last payment is counted.
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so did the pension benets. The second part of 1970s is characterised by monetary easing as the
nominal interest rates were kept below the actual and perspective ination rate (Nelson, 2000).
During the period from 1979 to 1989, monetary policies aiming to control ination were intro-
duced. Nelson (2000) notes that nominal interest rates were persistently below the ination rate
before 1980 and persistently above after. The same period is characterised by a dramatic increase
of inequality especially in disposable income. This has been attributed to higher unemployment,
increase of part time work and lower working hours of the employed and higher dispersion of wages
between low and high earners (Brewer and Wren-Lewis, 2012). The highest increase was that of
disposable income inequality. Even though income inequality was the lowest at the beginning of the
sample period, it catches up rapidly with consumption inequality in the mid 1980s. It is interesting
to note that from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s inequality in non-durable consumption was lower
than income inequality. This possibly reects the impact of nancial liberalization that took place
in mid-1980s and enabled greater access to consumer credit. In 1992 policies of ination targeting
were introduced and in 1997 the Bank of England gained operational independence. Inequality
levels for income and earnings didnt change dramatically but the Gini coe¢ cients for consumption
increased during this decade.
In the beginning of 2000s, inequality fell possibly due to a decrease of the investment income
and the collapse of the dotcom bubble. In 2007 nancial markets collapsed and the Great Recession
followed resulting in a deep fall of inequality for all measures, especially for consumption. In 2008
the Bank of England implemented unconventional, zero bound monetary polices and Quantitative
Easing. Interestingly, the Gini coe¢ cients for consumption and earnings increase substantially after
2010 while the one for disposable income remains at low levels. Overall, during the sample period
and from all the four variables, the Gini coe¢ cient of disposable income experiences the highest
rise.
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Figure 1: Gini Coe¢ cients (4 quarter moving average). Shaded areas represent recessions as identied by the OECD.
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3 Empirical Model
In order to estimate the impact of monetary policy shocks on the constructed inequality measures
we use a Structural VAR model. The benchmark model is dened as
Zt = c+
PX
j=1
BjZt j + vt (1)
where vt~N(0;
). The matrix of endogenous variables includes the standard set used for small open
economies: i.e. real GDP per capita, CPI ination, the three month treasury bill rate and the growth
of the nominal e¤ective exchange rate. As discussed below, restrictions on the contemporaneous
response of these variables allow us to identify a monetary policy shock. We augment this VAR
model with each of the inequality measures described above, in order to estimate the impact the
monetary policy shock on inequality related to earnings, income or consumption. All variables
except the interest rate and the inequality measure enter in log di¤erences. The lag length P is set
to 4 in the specications above.
We adopt a Bayesian approach to estimation and use a Gibbs sampling algorithm to approximate
the posterior distribution of the model parameters. As discussed in Uhlig (2005), this approach
o¤ers a convenient method to estimate error bands for impulse responses. Note, however, that we
use a at prior and, therefore, the results reported below are data driven. The estimation algorithm
is described in detail in the technical appendix to the paper.
3.1 Identication of the monetary policy shock
The covariance matrix of the residuals 
 can be decomposed as 
 = A0A00 where A0 represents the
contemporaneous impact of the structural shocks "t:
vt = A0"t (2)
Restrictions on the elements of A0 can be used to dene the shock of interest. In the benchmark
model we use sign restrictions to identify a monetary policy shock, imposing them on the appropriate
elements of A0 thus restricting the contemporaneous response of the endogenous variables to this
shock. We show below that the key results are robust to using di¤erent identication schemes.
We assume that a contractionary monetary policy shock leads to a contemporaneous increase
in the interest rate and the nominal exchange rate (an appreciation) and a fall in GDP growth
and ination. The response of the inequality measures is left una¤ected. These restrictions on
the macroeconomic variables are fairly standard and are implied by open economy models such as
Lubik and Schorfheide (2006). Note that for this exercise the model is estimated using data up to
2008Q4, thus avoiding the period coinciding with unconventional monetary policy.
The identication scheme is implemented as follows: we compute the structural impact matrix,
denoted A0; via the procedure introduced by Rubio-Ramírez, Waggoner and Zha (2008). Speci-
cally, let 
 =PDP 0 be the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition of the SVARs covariance matrix
, and let ~A0  PD 12 : We draw an N N matrix K from the N(0; 1) distribution and then take
the QR decomposition of K. That is, we compute Q and R such that K = QR:We then compute a
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structural impact matrix as A0 = ~A0Q0 and retain it if it satises the sign restrictions. As pointed
out in Fry and Pagan (2007), this procedure provides set identication and delivers a distribution
of contemporaneous impact matrices that are admissible under the sign restrictions. In order to
avoid merging the information from di¤erent admissible models, we select the A0 matrix that is
closest to the median from a given number of draws from the algorithm.
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Figure 2: The impulse response of the Gini coe¢ cient to a one standard deviation contractionary monetary policy shock. The vertical axis of each
plot shows the response in percent. The red line is the median estimate and the pink shaded area is the 68% error band.
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4 The response of inequality measures to monetary policy
shocks
Figure 2 present the results from the benchmark VAR model. Each row shows the response to a
one standard deviation contractionary monetary policy shock using the VAR model that includes
the Gini coe¢ cient derived from household data on wages, income, non-durable consumption and
total consumption respectively.
The response of the macroeconomic variables to this shock is fairly standard. The 10 basis point
increase in the short-term interest rate reduces GDP growth and ination by about 0.05% to 0.1%
on impact in all 4 models, while the growth of the NEER increases by about 2%-3%.
The policy shock leads to an increase in the Gini coe¢ cient across the four models. The null
hypothesis that this e¤ect is equal to zero can be rejected in all cases. In terms of magnitude,
the increase in the wage and income Gini coe¢ cient is about 0.3% at the one year horizon. The
non-durable and total consumption Gini coe¢ cient rises by more with the response suggesting an
increase of 0.7% to 1% one year after the shock. This latter result is similar to that reported by
Coibion et al. (2012) for the US who nd a stronger response of expenditure inequality. However, in
contrast to their estimates, we nd that the e¤ect on wage and income inequality is more persistent
than the impact on consumption and expenditure.5
The magnitude of the impulse responses suggests that the policy shock has a moderately large
impact. Given the range of estimates presented above, a shock that raises the short-rate by 100
basis point is estimated to increase the Gini coe¢ cients by 3% to 10% or by 0.009 to 0.03 in original
units. To put these gures in perspective, note that the increase in the Gini coe¢ cients observed
during the 1980s amounted to about 0.06 units, i.e. a 20% change between 1980Q1 and 1990Q1.
In order to test the robustness of these results, we conduct an extensive sensitivity analysis.
The detailed results from this analysis are presented in the on-line technical appendix to the paper.
Here we describe the key ndings.
We rst consider if the results are sensitive to the assumptions regarding the identication of
monetary policy shocks. The top panel of Figure A1 shows the response of the Gini coe¢ cient from
a VAR where the short-term interest rate is replaced by the Cloyne and Huertgen (2014) narrative
measure of monetary policy shocks (See Appendix A). Contractionary innovations to this shock
measure again lead to a persistent increase in Gini coe¢ cients. Next, we expand the information
set in the VAR. We follow the approach devised in Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2005) and use a
factor augmented VAR (FAVAR). The FAVAR model is estimated using a panel of 33 UK time-series
spanning real activity, ination, commodity prices and nancial variables. We augment this data set
with the Gini coe¢ cients constructed from income, wages, total and non-durable consumption and
identify the monetary policy shock using the benchmark sign identication scheme.6The bottom
panels of Figure A1 shows that the key results are even stronger when incorporating a larger infor-
5This may reect the fact that the persistence of wage growth was high, especially during the 1970s and the early
1980s. See for e.g. Nelson (2004).
6The FAVAR uses three factors. These factors explain over 70% of the variation in the dataset. The results are
robust to increasing the number of factors. Details about the FAVAR model and the dataset can be found in the
technical appendix.
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mation set when using this alternative methodology. The four Gini coe¢ cients show a persistent
increase in the face of the contractionary policy shock with the rise in the income and wage Gini
estimated to be larger than in the benchmark case. The technical appendix presents results from
VARs where the monetary policy shock is identied using a Cholesky decomposition (see Figure 3
in the technical appendix). The ordering of the variables implies that monetary policy shocks have
no contemporaneous impact on GDP, ination and the Gini coe¢ cient, but can a¤ect the NEER
immediately. The gure shows that the response of the Gini coe¢ cient based on wage, income
and total consumption expenditure is similar to the benchmark. The magnitude of the e¤ects are
marginally smaller using this identication scheme. Note, however, that the responses of ination
and the NEER are not consistent with predictions from standard open economy modelsination
rises and the exchange rate depreciates on impact in response to a monetary contraction. This po-
tentially suggests that the recursive scheme does not identify a policy shock exclusively, leading to
biased estimates of the impulse response functions. In Figure 4 in the technical appendix, we show
results from VAR models where the benchmark sign restriction scheme is augmented to identify an
aggregate demand and an aggregate supply shock. We use standard restrictions to identify these
two shocks a demand shock increases GDP growth, ination and the short term rate on impact
while a supply shock is restricted to move growth and ination in opposite directions on impact.
The gure shows that the main results are robust to this change in the identication scheme.
Finally, if the Gini coe¢ cients in the VAR models are replaced with the standard deviation of
logs as an alternative measure, the main results are preserved. Figure 1 in the technical appendix
shows that the key results are preserved  inequality increases after a policy shock with the null
hypothesis of a zero response rejected for most models.7
In summary, the benchmark results and the extensive sensitivity analysis provides strong evi-
dence that contractionary monetary policy shocks are associated with an increase in inequality in
the UK.
4.1 Heterogeneity of responses to policy shocks
In order to understand the possible reasons behind the response of inequality measures shown above
we consider how households and individuals at di¤erent points on the distribution respond to the
monetary policy shocks identied above. In particular, for each variable, we consider households
and individuals that fall within the following percentiles in a given quarter: P1 =

2nd : 19th

; P2 =
20th : 39th

; P3 = [40
th : 59th]; P4 = [60
th : 79th]; P5 = [80
th : 98th]. We then construct measures
of average real wage, real income and real per-capita consumption within these percentiles. These
measures are then included in the SVAR along with four macroeconomic variables used above
and their response to a monetary policy shock is examined. The shock is identied using the
identication scheme discussed in section 3.1 above with no restrictions placed on the household
level variables. Figure 3 plots the median response of each measure within di¤erent percentile
7We also consider the standard deviation of residual log income obtained after regressing household disposable
income on characteristics such as age and education. The impulse response of this measure to policy shocks are very
similar to the benchmark case (see technical appendix).
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groups to a contractionary policy shock. The top two panels of the gure show that a monetary
contraction has a large negative impact on the wages and income within the lowest percentile.
Wages in P1 decline by about 0.1% at the 2-3 year horizon, while the fall in P2 is estimated to
be about 0.05%. In contrast, the wages within the middle and higher percentiles display an initial
increase before returning to base. The response of income at higher percentiles shows a similar
pattern with the income in P5 rising by 0.1%. Note, however, that in contrast, income in groups
P3; P2 and P1 declines. This feature matches the results for the US reported in Coibion et al. (2012)
and is consistent with richer households deriving their income from nancial sources. In a detailed
analysis of the incomes of rich individuals, Brewer, Sibieta and Wren-Lewis (2008) show that the
proportion of their income derived from investments (e.g. interest on savings) is higher than that
of the average tax payer. This feature is also reected in the FES dataset as shown in Table 1.
The table shows a decomposition of gross income into shares of labour earnings and proceeds form
investment and income derived from transfers. The decomposition is calculated for households in
each percentile group, with P 5 denoting the group of households within the top percentile (i.e.
P 5 = [97
th : 98th] ). While wages form the largest proportion of income, it is clear from the table
that investment income is more important for households in the top income percentiles. It is also
interesting to note that the sharp initial decline in wage and income for the group P1 is reversed
fairly quickly. For wage, this may reect the e¤ects of higher unemployment in the wake of the
monetary contraction leading to low wage earners falling out of the distribution. As shown in Table
1, social security benets form a larger proportion of income of this group. This may play a role in
ameliorating the impact of the contractionary policy shock on income.
The bottom left panel of Figure 3 shows that the response of non-durable consumption groups
is initially volatile. However, one period after the shock, expenditure rises for group P1 while that
of group P5 declines. This pattern of responses is consistent with the possibility that households in
group P1 are credit constrained. If these households experience a persistent drop in their income as
a result of contractionary monetary policy, they may substitute their expenditure from durable to
non-durable goods (see Chan, Ramey and Starr (1995)). This occurs because future use of durable
goods is valued less when households would like to bring the consumption of these goods to the
present but are unable to do so because of credit constraints. At longer horizons, the non-durable
expenditure for households in group P1 is consistently lower than the other groups.
The bottom right panel of Figure 3 shows that inequality in total consumption expenditure is
driven by the fact that all groups of households experience a persistent decline in expenditure except
those in group P5 where the fall in consumption is reversed relatively quickly and even increases
for a few quarters a year after the shock. The pattern of the response for this group is similar to
the response for households in top two income percentile groups. In fact, about 70% of households
that fall within the top group for total expenditure have equivalized income that lies above the 60th
percentile. Given that investment income is more important for this group, the insights in Auclert
(2016) point to the additional possibility that the households in these top percentiles have positive
unhedged interest rate exposure (i.e. they might be characterised as households whose maturing
assets exceed their maturing liabilities ) with the interest rate increase benecial in redistributive
terms.
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Figure 3: The response to a contractionary monetary policy shock within di¤erent percentile groups.
13
Figure 4: Percentage contribution of monetary policy shocks to the forecast error
variance of the Gini coe¢ cient. The red line is the median estimate and the pink
shaded area is the 68% error band.
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Quantiles Labour Earnings Investment Proceeds Social Benets
1980s
P1 11.20 1.92 71.38
P2 39.56 3.36 34.54
P3 64.53 3.15 13.58
P4 73.35 3.35 7.09
P5 73.73 4.90 3.35
P5 68.06 7.04 1.85
1990s
P1 9.68 2.10 78.02
P2 37.09 3.73 40.06
P3 61.44 3.59 16.63
P4 72.31 3.80 7.18
P5 75.30 5.47 2.83
P5 71.86 9.42 1.45
2000s
P1 14.31 1.99 72.97
P2 39.61 2.26 40.86
P3 61.39 2.34 18.36
P4 73.66 2.61 7.67
P5 75.91 4.28 2.82
P5 73.38 3.97 1.50
2010-2012
P1 17.78 1.47 68.00
P2 39.15 1.60 40.67
P3 54.16 1.47 23.29
P4 70.45 1.96 9.71
P5 73.97 3.48 3.61
P5 69.16 5.72 2.82
Table 1: Decomposition of gross income into source (percentages).
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Figure 5: Historical contribution of the monetary policy shock to (de-trended) Gini Coe¢ cient. The
black dashed line shows the Gini coe¢ cient minus its VAR implied trend. The solid red line is the
median counterfactual estimate of the (de-trended) Gini coe¢ cient assuming that only the monetary
policy shock is non-zero. The pink shaded area is the 68% error band.
4.2 The contribution of monetary policy shocks to inequality
Figure 4 plots the contribution of the monetary policy shock to the forecast error variance (FEV)
of the Gini coe¢ cients. The estimated median contribution of this shock ranges from around 10%
at the two year horizon for income, wage and total consumption Gini to about 20% for non-durable
consumption inequality. The technical appendix shows that similar estimates are found when
the standard deviation of logs is considered instead. This suggests that the policy shock made a
contribution to inequality that was important both from an economic and statistical perspective.
It is interesting to note that these estimates are similar to those obtained by Coibion et al. (2012)
for US data.
In Figure 5, we consider if the monetary policy shock has played a role in driving cyclical
uctuations in the Gini coe¢ cient via a historical decomposition. The contribution of the structural
shocks "t can be calculated by noting that deviations of each variable in the VAR from a baseline
trend at horizon H are given as:
et (H) =
H 1X
h=0
~Ah"t+H h (3)
where ~Ah denote the impulse responses and "t are the shocks dened in equation 2. In Figure 5
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we display this calculation for the Gini coe¢ cient assuming that all elements of "t except the one
corresponding to the monetary policy shock is zero. Each panel in the gure plots the four Gini
coe¢ cients in percentage deviations from the VAR implied baseline trend (black dashed line). This
is compared with the counterfactual estimate of this variable under the assumption that only the
monetary policy shock is operational in the VAR model (red line and shaded area). The contribution
of the shock to uctuations in the wage and income Gini are modest. It appears that policy shocks
played a role during the mid and the late 1970s. During the second half of the 1970s, the UK
monetary authorities cut the nominal interest rate aggressively and narrow money growth rose
substantially (see Nelson, 2000). This expansionary policy appears to have made a contribution
leading to a reduction in wage and income Gini over this period. A similar impact can be detected on
the consumption inequality measures. It is interesting to note that after the late 1990s the median
contribution of the policy shock is positive in sign for all inequality measures. One interpretation of
this results is that the ination targeting period was characterised by contractionary policy shocks
as monetary authorities were more concerned with controlling ination and this exerted upward
pressure on the inequality measures.
5 The role of unconventional monetary policy
The analysis above has focussed on the role of monetary policy surprises in driving inequality.
However, the post-2008 period has seen the Bank of England use Quantitative Easing (QE) or
large-scale asset purchases to try and stimulate the economy. As part of this policy, the Bank
purchased UK government bonds by issuing central bank money. The aim was to reduce the
yield on Gilts and thus increase aggregate demand. QE can a¤ect demand in a number of ways.
However, one of the main channels of transmission is the portfolio balance channelas the price of
Gilts and related nancial assets increases, demand is stimulated through wealth e¤ects and lower
borrowing costs. Note that this channel has the potential to have an asymmetric distributional
impact, especially if agents at the upper end of the income or expenditure distribution have more
access to the assets a¤ected by QE.
In order to estimate the impact of QE on the measures of inequality we use two methods. First,
we follow the procedure described in Kapetanios et al. (2012). This involves estimating the VAR
model in equation 1 including the 10 year government bond spread as an extra variable. Thus
we assume that QE a¤ects the economy by reducing the yield on long term government bonds.
Following Kapetanios et al. (2012) we assume that this reduction amounted to about 100 basis
points. The VAR model is estimated up to 2008Q4. The model is then used to carry out two
conditional forecasts over the next 8 quarters. The rst conditional forecast assumes that the long
term spread and the short-term interest rate equal their observed values over the forecast horizon.
Kapetanios et al. (2012) refer to this as the policy scenarioas it incorporates the potential impact
of QE on long term interest rates. The second conditional forecast assumes that the path of the
long-term spread is higher than observed by 100 basis points over the forecast horizon while xing
the short-term interest rate at its observed value in each quarter. This simulation is assumed to
represent the no-policyscenario with the di¤erence between the two conditional forecasts capturing
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the potential impact of QE. Of course this approach ignores any impact that QE may have through
variables other than bond yields. However, given the short sample over which QE has been carried
out and the subsequent di¢ culty of disentangling di¤erent channels, recent studies on this issue
have adopted this simple approach (see Lenza, Pill and Reichlin, 2010).
As the approach of Kapetanios et al. (2012) involves out of sample forecasts from a simple VAR
model, uncertainty about these projections is typically high.8 To check the robustness of the results
obtained from the Kapetanios et al. (2012) approach, we also adopt the methods used in Baumeister
and Benati (2013). These authors adopt a more structural approach and use sign restrictions to
identify a shock to the 10 year government bond spread in their time-varying parameter VAR model
which is estimated until 2011. In particular, they assume that a contractionary spread shock leads
to a contemporaneous increase in the spread, a fall in ination and output growth but leaves the
short-term interest rate unchanged. In contrast, a monetary policy shock increase the short-rate
while leading to a fall in output growth, ination and the spread. With the identied spread shock
in hand, they carry out a counterfactual simulation over 2009. Under the counterfactual no-policy
scenario, the spread shocks are scaled up so that the simulated spread is higher than the actual
values prevailing over 2009. Baumeister and Benati (2013) compare the counterfactual path of
output growth with the actual path and nd that the recession was estimated to be substantially
worse under the counterfactual scenario. We adapt this approach for our analysis. We estimate
a time-varying parameter VAR using the short-term interest rate, the 10 year government bond
spread, the Gini coe¢ cient and real GDP growth.9 We identify a shock to the spread by assuming
that it has no contemporaneous impact on the short-rate but leads to an increase the spread and
a reduction in GDP growth. The monetary policy shock is assumed to increase the short-rate and
reduce the spread and GDP growth contemporaneously. Following Baumeister and Benati (2013),
we carry out a counterfactual experiment from 2009Q1 to 2010Q4. We scale the identied spread
shock such that the counterfactual value of the spread is higher than the actual value by 100 basis
points over these 8 quarters. We can then compare the implied path of the Gini coe¢ cient with
the actual path in order to investigate if the absence of QE was associated with a di¤erent outcome
for the Gini coe¢ cient.
5.1 Empirical results
In this section we present the results obtained via the counterfactual experiments based on Kapetan-
ios et al. (2012) and Baumeister and Benati (2013). While we focus on the outcome for the Gini
coe¢ cient, the counterfactual scenarios approximating the absence of QE are associated with a
peak impact of about -1% on GDP growth over the simulation period.
8Kapetanios et al. (2012) only present point forecasts and state that the estimates are uncertain. In our application
we nd that the forecast densities in both scenarios are extremely wide.
9Details on estimation of the model are provided in the technical appendix. We use a parsimonious 4 variable
model in order to ensure that the condition of stable VAR coe¢ cients can be satised at each point in time.
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Figure 6: The impact of QE on the inequality measures
Figure 6 shows the results of the counterfactual experiment based on the Kapetanios et al.
(2012) method. Each panel of the gure shows the actual data for the Gini coe¢ cient (solid blue
line), along with the median conditional forecasts under the policy scenario (black dashed line) and
no-policy scenario (green starred line).
The top two panels of the gure suggest that the forecast of the wage and income Gini coe¢ cient
is higher under the policy scenario. The bottom right panel indicates that QE initially reduced
inequality in consumption. However, from the second half of 2009, the non-durable consumption
Gini coe¢ cient is forecast to be lower under the no-policy scenario. It should be noted that the
forecast distributions associated with these scenarios are extremely wide and indicate a high degree
of uncertainty about these outcomes. We therefore consider if these results are supported by the
counterfactual analysis in the spirit of Baumeister and Benati (2013).
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Figure 7: The impact of QE on the inequality measures using the Baumeister and Benati (2013)
experiment.
The results from this counterfactual experiment are shown in Figure 7. The black dashed line
represents the actual observed path of the Gini coe¢ cient. After 2009, the green starred line is the
path resulting from the counterfactual assumption that the spread was 100 basis points higher over
this period. The shaded area represents the one standard deviation error band associated with the
counterfactual simulation. Evidence that wage and total consumption inequality was systematically
di¤erent in the absence of QE appears to be limited with the counterfactual distribution assigning
a large probability to either higher or lower inequality. In contrast, the mass of the counterfactual
distribution for the income and non-durable consumption Gini lies below the observed data suggest-
ing some evidence for the hypothesis that QE was associated with higher income and non-durable
consumption inequality.
Taking the evidence from the two counterfactual experiments together, the tentative conclusion
is that QE worsened income and non-durable consumption inequality, while evidence on an impact
on the remaining variables is much weaker.
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Figure 8: The impact of QE on income and consumption of percentile groups
In Figure 8, we explore this result further by re-running the rst counterfactual (see Figure
6) replacing the Gini coe¢ cients with percentile groups for income and non-durable consumption
dened above.10 The gure presents the di¤erence in the forecasts obtained under the policy and
non-policy scenario. Positive values for this quantity thus indicate that the forecast of income
and non-durable consumption is higher assuming that QE depressed long-term yields by 100 basis
points. The left panel of the gure shows that QE had a positive impact on the income of all
groups after 2009Q3. However, it is clear from the gure that group P5 derives the largest benet,
while the smallest increase in income occurs for group P1. Similarly, the right panel of gure 8
shows that from 2009Q2 onwards, non-durable consumption for groups P3; P4 and P5 appears have
been consistently higher. These redistributive e¤ects of QE may be driven by its impact on asset
prices. QE provides a signal to the market that short-term interest rates are likely to stay low in
the future. Moreover, Joyce et.al (2010) show that the transmission of this policy into long term
interest rates was driven through reductions in term premia with investors more willing to hold
longer term bonds thus reducing their unhedged interest rate exposure (see Auclert (2016)). If this
is the case for the high income and consumption groups in our data set, QE may benet them in a
disproportionate manner.
10 Including a large number of endogenous variables in a time-varying VAR makes estimation computationally
infeasible as it is di¢ cult to satisfy the VAR stability condition. We therefore focus on the rst counterfactual which
involves a xed coe¢ cient VAR.
21
6 Conclusions
This paper examines the impact of monetary policy shocks on earnings, income and consumption
inequality in the UK. We build quarterly historical time series for measures of labour earnings,
income and consumption inequality from the FES database. We then include these measures
in a structural VAR model and estimate that contractionary monetary policy shocks lead to an
increase in inequalitya one standard deviation policy contraction raises the Gini coe¢ cient by
about 1%. Impulse responses of earnings, income and consumption at the lower and upper tails of
the distribution suggest that contractionary monetary policy has a larger adverse e¤ect on these
variables for the former group.
Monetary policy shocks explain a signicant proportion of the uctuations in the inequality
measures with the contribution to the variance estimated to be about 20%. Historical decomposition
suggests that policy shocks contributed to a decrease in inequality in mid and the late 1970s but had
a positive impact over the post-ination targeting period. Finally, we estimate that QE may have led
to an increase in income inequality. Households who hold nancial assets which experienced price
appreciation may have beneted more than poorer households who dont have access to nancial
markets. These results suggest that the benecial macroeconomic impact of QE documented in
recent papers (Kapetanios et al. (2012) and Baumeister and Benati (2013)) may have to be qualied
by acknowledging the possibility of adverse distributional e¤ects.
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A Robustness of VAR identication
Figure A1: Response of Gini coe¢ cients from VARs using narrative measure of monetary
policy shock (top rows) and a FAVAR (bottom rows)
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